A multi-factor inequality approach to a transfer scheme: the case of Common Agricultural Policy by Palestini, Arsen & Pignataro, Giuseppe
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A multi-factor inequality approach 
to a transfer scheme: the case of 
Common Agricultural Policy 
 
 
Arsen Palestini 
Giuseppe Pignataro 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°891 
 
 
 
A multi-factor inequality approach to a transfer scheme: the
case of Common Agricultural Policy
Arsen Palestini
MEMOTEF, Sapienza University of Rome
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Rome, Italy
arsen.palestini@uniroma1.it
Giuseppe Pignataro
Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy
giuseppe.pignataro@unibo.it
June 29, 2013
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to propose theoretical foundations on the impact of transfer
scheme, e.g. Community Agricultural Policy, on income inequality within European Countries.
First, we show that ex-post inequality (in the after-transfer distribution) may increase if either
initial aggregate income or the amount of ﬁscal contributions are suﬃciently high. Second ac-
cording to welfare ordering, we characterize a multi-factor decomposition of the Atkinson index
to gauge the impact of each income source on the inequality proﬁle. Third, we introduce a
methodology to construct a cooperative game played by diﬀerent income factors (as net incomes
and/or incoming transfers) explicitly measuring the cost of inequality across the population in
terms of welfare loss. We ﬁnally rely on Banzhaf and Shapley values to determine the marginal
contributions of each factor to overall inequality.
Keywords: Atkinson index, income sources, Shapley, transfer scheme, cooperative game, CAP
JEL classiﬁcation: D31; D63; I32
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1 Introduction
Since the 70's European countries have systematically employed part of their direct taxation and
collections of rents to fund speciﬁc activities and to redistribute incomes across countries. The prime
objective of these policies is to attract ﬁrms based on the assumption that this will decrease regional
income inequality, increase employment, wages, and productivity in those regions. In the recent
debate, it seems however that these transfer schemes have been quite unsuccessful: political parties
of all shades, farmers' unions, environmental campaigners and taxpayer groups all lined up to say
these policies went either the wrong way, or not far enough. Empirical evidence even suggests that
although income per capita has slightly converged between Member States, it has diverged at the
regional level during the same period, see Combes and Overman [9].
Among all these programs, Community Agricultural Policy (CAP, hereafter) is the most expensive
scheme in the EU accounting for 47% of its annual budget, and perhaps is even the most controversial.
Its main goal is to guarantee a fair standard of living for agricultural community (European Union
[13], Article 33) contributing to the supply of European citizens with safe and high quality food. It
aims at responding to the public demand for a sustainable agricultural policy in Europe by ensuring
suﬃcient competitiveness while helping rural areas to remain attractive and viable. It relies on a
system of subsidies and support programs in a mix between direct payments to farmers together with
price or market supports1. In each state, tax payments imposed to diﬀerent class of farmers are
largely refunded by a revenue subsidy provided per hectare of land.
One of the most debatable questions on this issue is to understand whether or not, subsidies within
CAP, as tools of distributional policy, clearly contribute to the reduction of income inequalities in the
agricultural sector. For instance, as far as the issue of distribution of subsidies within agricultural
community is concerned, empirical evidence explains that the majority of payments go to the largest
businesses. Schmid et al. [26] state that in 2001, on average for 14 EU countries, 80% of direct
payments went to only 20% of businesses. The results vary signiﬁcantly even in terms of income
inequality proﬁles. On one side, Keeney [17] shows how the introduction of direct payments has
contributed to the more balanced income distribution of agricultural households. Hansen and Teuber
[18] suggest that the CAP transfers tend to smooth diﬀerences in farmers' revenues in the German
State of Hesse. Their empirical analysis, based on Shorrocks [29]'s inequality decomposition, show
a positive eﬀect of transfers within state associated to a reduction of inequality per capita in the
disposable income across regions. On the other side, Allanson [1] and [2] take into account the
redistribution impact of eﬀective agricultural policy as the diﬀerence between the inequality rate on
income including subsidies and the rate of inequality in income after the deduction of subsidies. He
outlines how the distribution of support is found to have exacerbated the inequality of farm incomes
in Scotland because of horizontal inequities in the incidence of transfers.
To the best of our knowledge, theoretical foundations devoted to characterize the dynamics of
farm support programs and its impact on income distribution among citizens still remain unexplored.
The aim of this paper is thus ﬁrst to model potential outgoing and incoming transfer schemes among
the European countries in order to observe how inequality in each state is aﬀected by a standard
procedure of aggregation of individual contributions. We study a simple environment where each
Member State levies taxes from its citizens, in compliance with its ﬁscal law, to raise money to
contribute to a global (European) fund. The aggregated amount must be subsequently reallocated
across States after a negotiation process such as a collective bargaining agreement. Note that we
do not address the issue of assignment of shares among Member States but we directly focus on the
related vector of received subsidies as given2. Whenever each State receives funds, it carries out a
1There exist more than 400 kinds of subsidies in Europe. They assume so many forms that it is diﬃcult to classify
them as subsidies to production, investment or labor. Some of these funds are granted in the form of interest-rate
payments, guarantees and participation in venture capital, while structural funds are mainly proposed as non-repayable
grants or indirect aid.
2The design of optimal decision rules in the EU has been widely addressed, also in view of its consecutive enlarge-
ments. A recent paper by Le Breton et al. [20] provides a complete discussion on the application of several power
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further internal redistribution, thereby assigning a fraction of funds to its citizens entitled to beneﬁt
from it. Income proﬁles are over time modiﬁed by such transfers, and this inﬂuences the inequality
proﬁle within the State. Our analysis involves the use of Atkinson index (see [3]) helpful to compare
the inequality levels before and after the transfers process. A relevant problem of redistribution policy
can thus be addressed: provided that the transfer scheme is convenient for a State, i.e., since the
aggregate contribution does not exceed the discounted value of its share from the bargaining (deﬁned
as proﬁtability condition), does its inequality level increase or decrease? Conditioned to it, two kinds
of eﬀects seem to show up: a) the impact of subsidies on the income of agricultural households
generates lower inequality with respect to the one in the initial income distribution; b) when the
poorest types do not contribute to the amount of outgoing transfers, i.e. when their tax rates are
zero, a reduction in inequality is easier to accomplish due to the transferring process.
As a second step we characterize a multi-factor decomposition of the Atkinson index since we are
interested to capture whether the eﬀect on overall inequality is concentrated in speciﬁc income items.
It should be crucial in terms of public policy to understand how much of the total income inequality
produced into the society is explained by a precise source and in particular to verify the eﬀect of
transfer on income proﬁle. Most of studies on this issue have focused on the Gini and the Theil
indices since they have particular features for decomposing inequality by income sources. Shorrocks
[28] proposes one of the pioneering procedure to aﬀord these types of decomposition. He proves that
it is possible to derive an inﬁnite number of decompositions without further restrictions; a property
which is called natural decomposition and is valid for the main inequality indices. According to this
procedure, Lerman and Yitzhaki [21] (LY, hereafter) propose a decomposition based on the covariance
formula of the Gini index à la Fei et al. [15]. They show that Gini coeﬃcient for the entire income
distribution is equal to the sum of Gini coeﬃcients computed by exploiting the covariance between
each income source and the cumulative distribution function of total income. In this way, they obtain
the impact of the marginal change in a given income source on overall inequality. Although it is a
natural decomposition, it indicates a clear measurement of the contribution of each source to income
inequality. Taking cue from LY [21], we show how the Atkinson measure can be decomposed by income
sources and we step further proposing it as a characteristic function of a cooperative game. We believe
that the decomposition by income factor components is a particularly helpful methodology to assess
the marginal contribution of each factor in terms of public policy. A recent discussion on analogous
games, both in terms of inequality and poverty measures, has been published by Charpentier and
Mussard [8]. We prove the subadditivity of the game with a measure of the social cost of inequality
according to Blackorby et al. [6]. In this scenario, we apply the standard Banzhaf-Coleman and
Shapley-Shubik values to evaluate the net income and the incoming transfers' contributions to the
overall inequality.
Our third step (still incomplete) is to normatively evaluate a new measure of welfare loss char-
acterized by the diﬀerence between the entire costs of inequality generated by the heterogeneity in
income distribution among income sources and the cost of inequality borne by the entire society. In
this case our aim is to observe the systematic eﬀect of public policy evaluating positivity and mono-
tonicity properties of this game. Other properties are still to be deﬁnitively arranged.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: section 2 outlines the necessary notation,
introduces the setup and the features of the main theoretical results achieved by employing the stan-
dard Atkinson index. Section 3 introduces the multi-factor Atkinson index of inequality discussing its
properties in a cooperative game of welfare loss. In section 4 we ﬁrst depict some anecdotal evidence
on the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe and then we assess a simple stylized application on
the proposed measure of inequality in this context. Conclusions follow in section 5.
indices and on the methodology for the assessment of the fair decision rules in the Council of Ministers of the EU across
the years, also showing the disproportionateness of power among States in some cases.
3
2 The basic setup
Consider a framework endowed with the following characteristics:
• There are n heterogeneous populations of agents. Each population can be viewed as a State
whose inhabitants are ranked by their income. They are endowed with p distinct amounts of
income: we indicate the income proﬁle of the i-th State with the vector xi = (x1i, . . . , xpi).
Every coordinate of xi can be looked upon as a subgroup of the i-th State's total population.
We are hypothesizing that all the subgroups are suﬃciently homogeneous and do not contain
very diﬀerent individual types. The aggregate income of the i-th State is Xi =
∑p
h=1 xhi.
• The vector yi = Aixi = (y1i, . . . , ypi) collects the fractions of all incomes which are provided
by the i-th State as its outgoing transfer.
• All the States' outgoing transfers form a unique aggregate capital which will be shared by the
States after a bargaining game, therefore we can view such gross capital as the grand coalition
value of a cooperative game, i.e.:
n∑
i=1
p∑
h=1
yhi = v(N),
where n ∈ 2n is the coalition of all States.
• The bargaining game takes place and consequently, the exogenous solution concept determines
the allocation of the beneﬁts gained by each State.
• Finally each State reallocates its share to one or more speciﬁc groups of its citizens according
to the incoming transfer scheme based on its own local rule.
The ﬁrst step consists in evaluating the initial level of inequality of income proﬁles employing one
of the common inequality indexes, e.g. the Atkinson one, see [3].
Subsequently, we take into account the structure of outgoing and incoming transfers. In order to
characterize the i-th vector of outgoing transfers, we construct a taxation matrix Ai. Ai ∈ Mp(R)
is a block matrix whose k main diagonal blocks are diagonal matrices. Each of them represents the
tax rate for a certain group of citizens involving at least one subgroup, whereas all the oﬀ-diagonal
blocks are zero matrices. Suppose that each main diagonal block is a p× p matrix and that the j-th
block is a diagonal pj × pj matrix, where pi1 + · · ·+ pik = p. The blocks of Ai can also be interpreted
as the k diﬀerent ﬁscal types of the i-th population. By this representation, we are partitioning the
population into k distinct types in accordance with their incomes' characteristics.
If cij ≥ 0 is the tax rate for the j-th group of citizens of the i-th State, we have the following
construction for the i-th vector of outgoing transfers:
Aixi =

ci1 0 · · · 0 | |
· · · · · · · · · · · · | |
0 · · · 0 ci1 | |
− − − − + − − − + − − − −
| · · · · · · · · · |
| · · · · · · · · · |
| · · · · · · · · · |
− − − − + − − − + − − − −
| | cik 0 · · · 0
| | · · · · · · · · · · · ·
| | 0 · · · 0 cik


x1i
x2i
...
...
...
...
...
...
xpi

=
4
=
ci1x1i
ci1x2i
...
ci1xp1,i
ci2xp1+1,i
...
ci2xp1+p2,i
...
...
cikxpi

=

y1i
y2i
...
...
...
...
...
...
ypi

= yi,
which is the i-th vector of contributions provided by the i-th State after taxation. Note that there
can be some low incomes that are not subject to taxation, and in that case the corresponding tax
rate is zero (for example, if the last block corresponds to the lowest incomes, cik = 0). The total
contribution provided by the i-th State is given by the sum of coordinates, i.e.
Ci :=
p1∑
h=1
ci1xhi +
p1+p2∑
h=p1+1
ci1xhi + · · ·+
p1+···+pk∑
h=p1+···+pk−1
cikxhi, (1)
then the total amount of all countries' transfers is given by T :=
∑n
i=1 Ci.
T is the aggregate contribution that is going to be allocated among the member States according
to a collective agreement motivated as a result of a bargaining process. If we deﬁne a cooperative
game whose solution concept is the allocation of T among players, we can consider T as the worth
of the grand coalition of the game, i.e., v(n) = T , see [23]. The topic of power assessment in EU's
Countries has been extensively studied in recent years, and there is still a lively debate on the most
suitable power index to be used (see [5], [19], [20]). We avoid delving into such issue which is beyond
the scope of our paper.
Suppose that, after the bargaining game, the distribution of T among the States is described by
the vector D := (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Rn+. Subsequently, the i-th State will have to implement an incoming
transfer procedure. If di is the positive amount that the i-th State must allocate, such quantity will
have to be assigned to the speciﬁc group of inhabitants which beneﬁt from the funding. We are
assuming that the involved group is composed by subgroups which had a speciﬁc unique tax rate, say
cil, when they contributed to overall outgoing transfer. This means that the l-th block of the matrix
Ai corresponds to the only type which receives a fraction of the incoming transfer. Because di must
be apportioned according to an intrinsic distribution scheme, we can indicate with αil(s) ∈ [0, 1) the
share of di which is assigned to the s-th subgroup in the l-th block, for s = 1, . . . , pl. By construction,
for all i = 1, . . . , n, we will have that αil(1) + · · ·+ αil(pl) = 1.
Furthermore, assume that the incoming transfer takes place at time t1, and that it is subject
to a discount factor (for example, depending on the ongoing inﬂation rate) e−δt1 . Then, after the
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bargaining and transfer processes the ﬁnal income vector of the i-th State becomes:
zi =

x1i − ci1x1i
...
xp1,i − ci1xp1,i
...
xp1+···+pl−1+1,i − cilxp1+···+pl−1+1,i + αil(1)die−δt1
...
xp1+···+pl,i − cilxp1+···+pl,i + αil(pl)die−δt1
...
...
xpi − cikxpi

. (2)
The condition of proﬁtability for the i-th State after the transfers process is given by:
Xi ≤
p∑
h=1
zhi ⇐⇒ Ci ≤ die−δt1 , (3)
whose economic meaning is straightforward: the aggregate amount of outgoing transfers must not
exceed the discounted value of the share gained in the bargaining game. Also note that (3) implies
the positivity of the ﬁnal aggregate income, i.e. the sum of coordinates of (2).
We are going to evaluate the inequality level of zi by calculating its Atkinson index of inequality
and then to carry out a comparison between the ex ante and ex post distributions.
In its standard form, given an income distribution xi = (x1i, . . . , xpi), the Atkinson index of
inequality IA reads as follows:
IA(xi) = 1−
p−

1−
[∑p
h=1 x
1−
hi
] 1
1−∑p
h=1 xhi
, (4)
where  ∈ (0, 1) is an aversion parameter. In particular, we have that:
IA(zi) = 1−
p−

1−
[∑p1+···+pl−1
h=1 (xhi − yhi)1− +
∑pl
h=1
(
xp1+···+pl−1+h,i − yp1+···+pl−1+h,i+∑p
h=1 (xhi − yhi) +
∑pl
h=1 (αil(h)die
−δt1)
+αil(s)die
−δt1)1− +∑ph=p1+···+pl+1 (xhi − yhi)1−] 11−∑p
h=1 (xhi − yhi) +
∑pl
h=1 (αil(h)die
−δt1)
.
Before delving into the assessment of such comparison, we build the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Given two vectors a = (a1, . . . , ap), b = (b1, . . . , bp) ∈ Rp+, for any pair of integer
numbers r and s such that 1 ≤ r < s < p, and for any α ∈ (0, 1), if ∑ph=1 ah ≤∑ph=1 bh and if
p∑
h=1
aαh ≤
r∑
h=1
bαh +
r+s∑
h=r+1
bαh +
p∑
h=r+s+1
bαh . (5)
then IA(a)− IA(b) ≥ 0.
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Proof. Let  = 1−α be the aversion parameter. Calculating the diﬀerence between the two Atkinson
inequality indices of the vectors yields:
IA(a)− IA(b) = −p− 1α+1
 [
∑p
h=1 a
α
h ]
1
α∑p
h=1 ah
−
[∑r
h=1 b
α
h +
∑r+s
h=r+1 b
α
h +
∑p
h=r+s+1 b
α
h
] 1
α∑p
h=1 bh
 =
= −p− 1α+1

[ ∑p
h=1 a
α
h
(
∑p
h=1 ah)
α
] 1
α
−
[∑r
h=1 b
α
h +
∑r+s
h=r+1 b
α
h +
∑p
h=r+s+1 b
α
h
(
∑p
h=1 bh)
α
] 1
α
 ,
which is positive if and only if∑p
h=1 a
α
h
(
∑p
h=1 ah)
α ≤
∑r
h=1 b
α
h +
∑r+s
h=r+1 b
α
h +
∑p
h=r+s+1 b
α
h
(
∑p
h=1 bh)
α . (6)
Consider the following quantity:(
p∑
h=1
ah
)α [ r∑
h=1
bαh +
r+s∑
h=r+1
bαh +
p∑
h=r+s+1
bαh
]
.
The assumption
∑p
h=1 ah ≤
∑p
h=1 bh implies that(
p∑
h=1
ah
)α [ r∑
h=1
bαh +
r+s∑
h=r+1
bαh +
p∑
h=r+s+1
bαh
]
≤
≤
(
p∑
h=1
bh
)α [ r∑
h=1
bαh +
r+s∑
h=r+1
bαh +
p∑
h=r+s+1
bαh
]
.
Hence (6) holds if we have:
p∑
h=1
aαh ≤
r∑
h=1
bαh +
r+s∑
h=r+1
bαh +
p∑
h=r+s+1
bαh . (7)
Lemma 1 leads us to evaluate the diﬀerence between IA(xi) and IA(zi).
Proposition 1. Under the proﬁtability condition (3), if
p∑
h=1
x1−hi ≤
p1+···+pl−1∑
h=1
(xhi − yhi)1− +
+
pl∑
h=1
(
xp1+···+pl−1+h,i − yp1+···+pl−1+h,i + αil(h)die−δt1
)1−
+
p∑
h=p1+···+pl+1
(xhi − yhi)1− ,
then IA(xi) ≥ IA(zi).
Proof. It suﬃces to apply Lemma 1 to the vectors xi and zi, using the parameters r = p1 + · · ·+pl−1
and s = pl.
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Proposition 1 seems to suggest that if either the initial aggregate income or the ﬁscal contributions
are suﬃciently high, the level of inequality tends to increase after the transfers process. Adopting
the same approach, Proposition 2 tends to characterize the same assessment when the poorest (i.e.,
endowed with the lowest incomes) types are granted a full tax exemption. We suppose that the tax
rate is zero for all subgroups that appear under the l-th block in the matrix Ai, meaning that all
types of citizens having an income lower than the farmers' income do not contribute to the outgoing
transfers at all. Such assumption can be expressed by making the related tax rates vanish, i.e.:
ci,l+1 = ci,l+2 = · · · = cik = 0. (8)
Proposition 2. If (8) holds, under the proﬁtability condition (3), we have that if
p∑
h=1
x1−hi ≤
p1+···+pl−1∑
h=1
(xhi − yhi)1− +
+
pl∑
h=1
(
xp1+···+pl−1+h,i − yp1+···+pl−1+h,i + αil(h)die−δt1
)1−
,
then IA(xi) ≥ IA(zi).
Proof. We can repeat the process adopted in the proof of Lemma 1 and with the notation employed
in Proposition 1, adding the hypothesis that xhi = yhi for all h = p1 + · · ·+ pl + 1, . . . , p.
Note that the suﬃcient hypothesis in Proposition 2 is more restrictive than the one in Proposition
1. In the case of no-tax area, the policy seems to be more eﬀective due to the reduction of inequality
in the income proﬁle. Intuitively in the ex-post evaluation, after delivering funds, equality mainly
improves since one (or more) types does not contribute to the policy in the ﬁrst stage while major
contributors cross-subsidizes minor ones who ﬁnally get the whole amount of money assigned to the
State. Improved agricultural production thus could be seen as one of the overall objectives for unequal
reduction in the country. Note that for the funds to create the impacts for which they were designed,
they not only need continuity in the ranking proﬁle, but also proper structures in terms of proﬁtability
condition for the state.
3 Assessment of inequality in a multi-factor setup
3.1 The Atkinson index of inequality in a multi-factor setup
In our view the evaluation of policy cannot be simply related on the ex-post distribution of income
proﬁle but a deeper investigation is required. We believe that some information can be captured
disentangling the eﬀect of each source; thus for instance, we may understand how income proﬁle
performs on the basis of assigned funds by the related policy. A more complex framework must be
introduced where each individual gains her income from more than one source. The generic income
unit is yij , which is the j-th component of income of individual i. Since the population ofN individuals
is subject to m distinct income factors, let S = N ×m be the number of income units in our society.
Each individual is endowed with an income vector, and every income vector collects all in-
come sources of the related individual, that is the i-th individual is associated to the vector yi =
(y1i, y2i, . . . , ymi) ∈ Rm+ . Assuming that at least one of the coordinates of each income vector is strictly
positive, we call Y = {y1, . . . ,ym} ∈ RS+ the set of income vectors. In other words, we are supposing
that the factors F1, . . .Fm are employed to generate Y , i.e., there exists a production function f(·)
such that Y = f(F1, . . .Fm).
Note that the circumstances where not all individuals are aﬀected by all income factors is taken
into account as well, i.e., some income is allowed to be zero. If the i-th individual is not aﬀected by
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the j-th factor, we posit yij = 0, always requiring that at least one of the incomes of the same factor
is strictly positive, i.e., for each individual i there exists at least one factor Fk such that yik > 0.
In order to construct a measure of inequality when more than one income factor aﬀects the
population, we can separately take into account each factor and evaluate the inequality level caused
by each source.
We take into account a social welfare function for diﬀerentiated income components as follows:
W (y11, . . . , yNm) =
1
Nm
m∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Uij(yij) =
=
1
m
(∑N
p=1 Up1(yp1)
N
+
∑2N
p=N+1 Up2(yp2)
N
+ · · ·+
∑mN
p=N(m−1) Upm(ypm)
N
)
.
If we indicate with
Wj(y1j , . . . , yNj) =
1
N
jN∑
p=N(j−1)+1
Upj(ypj),
then obviously
W (y11, . . . , yNm) =
m∑
j=1
Wj(y1j , . . . , yNj)
m
,
consequently the expression becomes the average of m diﬀerent welfare functions where each one
of them is associated to a diﬀerent factor and received an equal weight on welfare orderings. If we
replicate the procedure carried out in the one-factor setting, we have that, for all factors j = 1, . . . ,m:
Wj(y1j , . . . , yNj) = Wj(yej , . . . , yej) = Uj(yej) ⇐⇒

1
1− y
1−
ej =
1
N
∑N
p=1
y1−pj
1− 
log yej =
1
N
∑N
p=1 log ypj
(9)
Assuming that a unique inequality aversion parameter is required, we can deﬁne the form of the
utility function. Calling YFj the income vector associated to factor Fj , by (9) we are able to determine
the multi-factor ede yej as in the standard one-factor Atkinson setting, i.e.
yej =
[
1
N
∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−
if  ∈ (0, 1)
yej =
[∏N
p=1 ypj
] 1
N
if  = 1
, (10)
for all j = 1, . . . ,m. If we call µj =
1
N
∑N
i=1 yij the mean income related to the j-th factor, we
can simply express the Atkinson inequality measure as IA(YFj ) = 1−
yej
µj
, and even more generally
IA(YF1,...,Fk) = 1−
1
k
k∑
j=1
yej
µj
,
for k = 2, . . . ,m. We are ready to introduce a new formulation for an Atkinson-based index of
inequality IA(Y ).
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Deﬁnition 1. Given the income distribution Y ∈ RS+ and the factors F1, . . .Fm, the multi-factor
Atkinson index of inequality IA(YF1,...Fm) is given by:
IA(YF1,...,Fm) = 1−
1
m
m∑
j=1
yej
µj
=

1− N
− 1−
m
∑m
j=1

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
 if  ∈ (0, 1)
1− N
m
∑m
j=1

[∏N
p=1 ypj
] 1
N∑N
p=1 ypj
 if  = 1
. (11)
Note that when m = 1, the two indices coincide: IA(Y ) = IA(YF )3.
Furthermore, if we call EjA(Y ) the Atkinson index of equality calculated with respect to the j-th
factor, it is straightforward to prove the following identity, which connects the one-factor index with
the multi-factor index:
IA(Y ) = 1− 1
m
m∑
j=1
EjA(Y ). (12)
3.2 The Atkinson index as the characteristic function of a cooperative
game
We are going to carry out a decomposition of the inequality index (12) based on values or power indices
such as the Banzhaf value4 and the Shapley value5. Such approach has been adopted in literature
on inequality assessment, in particular we refer to theoretical background decomposition based on
Shorrocks [28], [29]; whereas important applications are developed by Shorrocks [30] and Chantreuil
and Trannoy [7]6. This technique leads to establish the marginal contribution of each factor to the
aggregate inequality level, by looking upon factors as if they were players of a cooperative game.
A complete theoretical construction of inequality games, including a rich overview of their relations
with factor decomposition and Shapley value, has been recently provided by [8]. We will conﬁne our
attention to the cooperative game structure which is appropriate for our outgoing/incoming transfer
setting and deduce some of its properties to delve into its economic signiﬁcance.
Call P = {F1, . . . ,Fm} the set of players. In such game, coalitions of factors are supposed to be
deﬁned rigorously as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. S ⊆ P is a coalition of factors if for all j ∈ S, there exists at least one income ydj
diﬀerent from the arithmetic mean
∑N
p=1 ypj
µj
.
Consequently, when we evaluate inequality related to some factors, we rule out all constant factors,
i.e., all elements which assign the same income to all individuals or types. The characteristic function
3Furthermore, the index introduced by Deﬁnition 1 can be viewed as the arithmetic mean between the standard
Atkinson indices: it is easy to show that if  ∈ (0, 1)
IA(YF1,...,Fm ) =
IA(YF1 ) + · · ·+ IA(YFm )
m
.
4The Banzhaf value was initially introduced in [4] in 1965 as a power index for voting games and subsequently
axiomatized and generalized to arbitrary cooperative games.
5The Shapley value is a world famous solution concept in Cooperative Game Theory, initially introduced in [27] in
1953 and then widely employed in Election Games, Bargaining Theory and many other areas. An exhaustive overview
of power indices, including axiomatization and applications, is [23].
6Pignataro [24] proposes an application of Shapley value in the opportunity egalitarian environment.
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of the game is the inequality function IA(YS), i.e., the multi-factor Atkinson index evaluated at S,
which can be any coalition of factors, such that:
IA(YS) = 1− 1|S|
∑
j∈S
yej
µj
= 1− N
− 1−
|S|
∑
j∈S

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
 , (13)
for all S ⊆ P, S 6= ∅. In (13), |S| indicates the cardinality of the set S ⊆ P. In order to describe
a correct cooperative game structure, the characteristic function must be well-deﬁned, in that it has
to vanish when it is evaluated at the empty set. Basically, when no income source is considered,
inequality must not be diﬀerent from 0, but clearly the expression (13) does not vanish in that case.
Hence, we can establish it by convention: IA(Y∅) = 0, that is the maximum equality is attained
when no factors are taken into account. This hypothesis is crucial to construct a cooperative game,
but on the other hand it is easy to show that such a game is neither monotone nor superadditive.
Furthermore, it is not a simple game, so many classical properties of cooperative games do not hold.
In particular, we can prove its subadditivity property:
Proposition 3. The game (IA, P) is subadditive, i.e. for all coalitions S, T ⊂ P, such that
S ∩ T = ∅, we have that:
IA(YS∪T ) < IA(YS) + IA(YT ). (14)
Proof. Employing (13) yields:
IA(YS∪T )− IA(YS)− IA(YT ) = 1− N
− 1−
|S + T |
∑
j∈S∪T

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
− 1+
+
N−

1−
|S|
∑
j∈S

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
− 1 + N− 1−|T | ∑
j∈T

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
 =
= −1− N
− 1−
|S + T |
∑
j∈S

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
+∑
j∈T

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj

+
+
N−

1−
|S|
∑
j∈S

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
+ N− 1−|T | ∑
j∈T

[∑N
p=1 y
1−
pj
] 1
1−∑N
p=1 ypj
 = · · · =
= −1 + |T ||S + T | (1− IA(YS)) +
|S|
|S + T | (1− IA(YT )) =
=
−|S + T |+ |T | − |T |IA(YS) + |S| − |S|IA(YT )
|S + T | < 0,
after exploiting that |S + T | = |S|+ |T |, thus completing the proof of (14).
The subadditivity property may suggest a further interpretation of the framework: typically, the
subadditive cooperative games are cost games, that is games where the value function indicates a
measure of cost assigned to each coalition, which can be viewed as the social cost of inequality in
our case. In such games, subadditivity enlightens that players or coalitions have an incentive to form
coalitions to lower their costs with respect to the individual costs they would have to aﬀord without
cooperating (see [11], Chapter 2, for example).
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In a general theoretical setup, also with an arbitrarily large number of factors, these values are
helpful to determine the marginal contribution of each factor to inequality.
To explain this procedure, we begin by adapting the standard deﬁnition of Shapley value and of
Banzhaf value to our framework:
Deﬁnition 3. The Banzhaf value of the game (IA, P) is a vector
β(IA) = (β1(IA), . . . , βm(IA)) ∈ Rm
such that:
βj(IA) = 1
2m−1
∑
S⊆P, j∈S
(IA(S)− IA(S \ {j})), (15)
for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Deﬁnition 4. The Shapley value of the game (IA, P) is a vector
Φ(IA) = (φ1(IA), . . . , φm(IA)) ∈ Rm
such that:
φj(IA) =
∑
S⊆P, j∈S
(m− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
m!
(IA(S)− IA(S \ {j})), (16)
for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Both values may be employed to deﬁne the marginal contributions of factors to inequality. For
example, in a 3-factor case, calling the factors F1, F2 and F3, β1(IA) and φ1(IA) respectively amount
to:
β1(IA) = 1
4
[IA(Y{F1,F2,F3})− IA(YF2,F3) + IA(Y{F1,F2})− IA(Y{F2})+
+IA(Y{F1,F3})− IA(YF3) + IA(YF1)− IA(Y∅)
]
,
and
φ1(IA) = 1
6
[
2(IA(Y{F1,F2,F3})− IA(YF2,F3)) + IA(Y{F1,F2})− IA(Y{F2})+
+IA(Y{F1,F3})− IA(YF3) + 2(IA(YF1)− IA(Y∅))
]
.
As is well-known, when the factors (or players) are 2, the Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
coincide.
One of the standard notions of Cooperative Game Theory which seems to be helpful in this
framework is the concept of excess of a coalition with respect to a given allocation. In our case,
an allocation is a vector (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm such that
∑m
i=1 ui = IA(YF1,...,Fm). We can apply the
standard deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5. Given an allocation u ∈ Rm, the excess of a coalition S with respect to u is the
following number:
e(S, u) = IA(YS)−
∑
i∈S
ui. (17)
Provided that the inequality driven by all factors is given by IA(YF1,...,Fm), an allocation is
any vector representing a method for sharing such social cost among factors (the Shapley value is
an allocation, whereas the Banzhaf value is not). Therefore, choosing an allocation has the same
meaning of attributing the cause of inequality to several factors according to some scheme, so the
excess of a set of factors may measure the diﬀerence between the real inequality-based cost provoked
by a group of factors and the cost which is attributed to those factors by this assignment. If we set
emin(u) := min {e(S, u) | ∅ 6= S 6= P} ,
we can deﬁne two further relevant solution concepts (see [14]):
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Deﬁnition 6. The set
Core(IA) := {u ∈ Rm | u1 + · · ·+ uN = IA(YF1,...,Fm), emin(u) ≥ 0}
is the core of the game (IA,P), i.e. the set of all allocations whose excesses are non-negative.
Deﬁnition 7. Given an allocation u ∈ Rm, such that ui ≤ IA(YFi) for all i = 1, . . . ,m7, if Θ(u) is
the (2|P| − 2)-dimensional vector of all excesses e(S, u), where ∅ 6= S 6= P, arranged in lexicographic
order, the nucleolus of (IA,P) is the unique u∗ that lexicographically maximizes Θ(u) over the subset
of all such allocations.
In particular, the nucleolus, introduced by Schmeidler [25] in 1969, can be quite meaningful for
our purpose. Namely, because the nucleolus minimizes the maximum diﬀerence between the actual
cost and the sum of contributions in a feasible distribution of costs among factors, we might interpret
it as the distribution of costs which represents the aggregate cost in the most suitable way. Extending
this characterization to inequality leads to design the nucleolus as a precise indicator of each factor's
marginal contribution. An related idea is developed in the next Subsection.
3.3 Assessment of the social cost of inequality
Given the structure of the cooperative game, we extend the analysis decomposing the Atkinson index
in terms of cost of inequality or wasted income, see Blackorby [6]. As a general rule the cost of
inequality formula measures the fraction of total income which could be sacriﬁced with no loss of
social welfare if the income sources were to be equally distributed, i.e., ede among individuals. By
taking into account all factors F1, . . .Fm employed to generate Y , (11) can be expressed as:
IA(YF1,...,Fm) = 1−
1
m
m∑
j=1
yej
µj
=
m∑
j=1
(
1
m
− 1
m
yej
µj
)
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
(
µj − yej
µj
)
.
Thus the cost of inequality due to the j-th source is CA(YFj ) =
µj − yej
µj
, i.e., the diﬀerence between
the average income due to the j-th factor minus the j-th ede in the society in relative terms. The
multi-factor Atkinson index of inequality can then be interpreted as the average cost of inequality
induced by factors F1, . . . ,Fm into the society, i.e.:
CA(YF1,...,Fm) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
CA(YFj ) = IA(YF1,...,Fm).
Because we can formulate the standard Atkinson index of inequality due to the factor coalition S
as follows:
IA(YS) = 1− ye,S
µS
=

1−
|S|− 1− N− 1−
[∑|S|
j=1
∑N
i=1 y
1−
ij
] 1
1−
∑|S|
j=1
∑N
i=1 yij
if  ∈ (0, 1)
1−
|S|N
[∏|S|
j=1
∏N
i=1 yij
] 1
T
∑|S|
j=1
∑N
i=1 yij
if  = 1
, (18)
the ede-income for the involved distribution is then deﬁned as:
7Also known as an imputation, see for example [14] or [23].
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
ye,S =
[
1
|S|N
∑|S|
j=1
∑N
i=1 y
1−
ij
] 1
1−
if  ∈ (0, 1)
ye,S =
[∏|S|
j=1
∏N
i=1 yij
] 1
S
if  = 1
.
From now on, we consider  ∈ (0, 1) and we rely on the following notation: yˆS is the ede-income
associated to the factor coalition S.
Consequently, we can deﬁne KA(YS) := µS − yˆS
µS
and adopt a cooperative game approach to
evaluate the cost of inequality. Loosely speaking, we introduce a cost allocation game (CA, P), where
CA(Y∅) represents the least cost of in terms of saving when no factors are taken into account. Since we
are interested in measuring the eﬀect of communitarian policy, we may take into account a cooperative
game (LA, P), whose characteristic function is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 8. We call welfare loss function the following characteristic value:
LA(S) =
∑
j∈S
CA(YFj )−KA(YS),
for all S ⊆ P.
Note that the above convention on the value of the empty set entails LA(∅) = 0, so the cooperative
game is well-deﬁned. Some properties of the function introduced in Deﬁnition 8 can be investigated.
The following Propositions collect some results.
Proposition 4. LA(S) =
∑
j∈S CA(YFj )−KA(YS) is positive for all S ∈ P \ ∅.
Proof. If S ∈ P \ ∅, we have that:
LA(S) =
|S|∑
j=1
(
1− yˆ{j}
µj
)
− 1 + yˆS
µS
= |S| −
|S|∑
j=1
yˆ{j}
µj
− 1 + yˆS
µS
=
= |S| −
|S|∑
j=1
yˆ{j}
µj
− 1 + |S| yˆS∑|S|
j=1 µj
≥ 1−
|S|∑
j=1
yˆ{j}
µj
+ |S| yˆS∑|S|
j=1 µj
≥ 0,
because |S| − 1 ≥ 1.
Proposition 5. If
yˆS ≥ yˆFj and CA(S) > EA(Fj) (19)
then for all S ⊂ P \ Fj, we have that LA(S ∪ Fj) > LA(S).
Proof.
LA(S ∪ J )− LA(S) = 1− yˆj
µj
− 1 + yˆS∪j
µS∪j
+ 1− yˆS
µS
=
= 1 +
yˆS∪j
µS∪j
− yˆj
µj
− yˆS
µS
Since µS∪j =
|S|µS+µj
|S|+1 , we can rewrite:
1 +
(|S|+ 1) yˆS∪j
|S|µS + µj −
yˆj
µj
− yˆS
µS
≥
1 +
yˆS∪j
|S|µS + µj −
yˆj
µj
− yˆS
µS
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If yˆS ≥ yˆj then yˆS∪j ≥ yˆj , therefore
1 +
yˆS∪j
|S|µS + µj −
yˆj
µj
− yˆS
µS
≥ 1 + yˆj|S|µS + µj −
yˆj
µj
− yˆS
µS
=
= 1− yˆS
µS
+
yˆjµj − yˆj (|S|µS + µj)
(|S|µS + µj)µj = 1−
yˆS
µS
− |S|µS
(|S|µS + µj)µj yˆj
=
µjµS (|S|µS + µj)− yˆS
(|S|µSµj + µ2j)− yˆj |S|µS
µjµS (|S|µS + µj) =
=
|S|µjµ2S + µ2jµS − |S|µSµj yˆS − µ2j yˆS − |S|µ2S yˆj
µjµS (|S|µS + µj)
First, note that
µ2jµS − µ2j yˆS > 0 since µS − yˆS by deﬁnition
Second, note that
|S|µjµ2S − |S|µSµj yˆS − |S|µ2S yˆj = µjµS − µj yˆS − µS yˆj
this is positive when
µj(µS − yˆS) > µS yˆj so that
µS − yˆS
µS
>
yˆj
µj
we can express this condition as
CA(S) > EA(Fj)
Thus LA(S ∪ J )− LA(S) is monotonically increasing whenever the cost of inequality associated
to the coalition S is higher than the equality originated by the evaluation of income sources j.
In particular, the latest Proposition intends to capture the marginal eﬀect of the CAP-driven
factor. The welfare loss function is constructed similarly to the excess function. In a sense, to the
extent that a procedure for minimizing it may be carried out, we would ﬁnd a correct evaluation of
marginal contributions. We expect that relevant developments can be made in applying the same
procedure that yields the coordinates of the nucleolus, provided that some minor diﬀerences occur.
What might provide interesting information on the distance between the standard and the multi-
factorial approach to the evaluation of inequality is the determination of the conditions under which
a multi-factor index of inequality has the same form of a nucleolus in this setup.
4 Income proﬁles designed on CAP
4.1 European Common Agricultural Policy
We ﬁrst describe how the transfers' scheme within European Countries contributes to the EU budget
and how getting funds from the CAP (direct aid, export refunds and several kinds of subsidies)
implies potential redistribution among farmers. CAP program started in 1962 and was reformed
many times. The general idea towards supporting agriculture remains along years in order to ensure
a level playing ﬁeld for farmers competing in the internal and on the global market with a common
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set of objectives, principles and rules. Without a common policy, Member States would proceed
with their own national policies with variable scope and with diﬀerent degrees of public intervention.
Instead the CAP ensures common rules in a single market promoting also a common trade policy
since potential re-nationalization of agricultural policy should have a high risk of distorting the
common market principle, with diverging support levels and types of policy mechanisms. The CAP
budget nowadays is entirely devoted on income support for farmers, projects in rural development
and protection of the environment and support of the market when weather shocks occur (for a
simple overview, see [10]). In 2006 CAP accounted for 46.7% of the total budget, whereas for 2014-
2020 such quota is projected to be considerably cut, probably to around 30%. The CAP plan has
also been aﬀected by wide-ranging criticism (see among others, [16] and [22]) concerning oversupply,
inappropriate environmental development, creation of artiﬁcially high food prices and lack of equity
among Member States. The CAP costs European taxpayers on average over e 40 billion per year or
in other terms almost 40% of the total EU budget. That is a signiﬁcant amount of money in particular
if we take into account that farming accounts for less than 2% of the EU's workforce. Yet the share
of the budget devoted to CAP spending has fallen sharply: 20 years ago, it was 70%. Moreover, the
CAP has been reformed signiﬁcantly, most recently in 2003, when a deal was struck to complete the
switch of most CAP subsidies from price supports to direct income payments. After this reform has
been fully implemented, some 90% of EU farm support will be classiﬁed as non trade-distorting.
Perhaps it is helpful to summarize some basic notions on the EU budget (for more details, see [31]).
EU's resources are of three kinds: Traditional Own Resources, consisting of duties that are charged
on imports of products coming from non-EU States, which account for 11% of the total budget; the
resource based on VAT, applied to each Member State's own harmonised VAT revenue, accounting
for approximately 12% of the budget; the resource based on GNI, which is the largest source of
revenue and accounts for around 76% of EU's budget. As can be noted, these three sources are
not completely tax-based, whereas our assumptions characterize the transfers of each State to the
EU only in terms of ﬁscal contributions. To simplify computations, we consider that each Member
State's total contribution to the EU budget is shared among the diﬀerent types of its population
in compliance with the related income proﬁles, and assuming progressive taxation in all Countries,
consequently with the tax rates.
4.2 Multi-factor approach to CAP
Now let us consider the framework outlined in section 2: in the i-th State, k diﬀerent ﬁscal types and
3 diﬀerent income factors are considered. We denote as Net Income (NI), the diﬀerence xi−yi, while,
Incoming Transfers (IT) corresponds to zi − (xi − yi), plus a further factor which is not inﬂuenced
by the transfers scheme. Assuming that a share of individuals' incomes are not subject to taxation,
the third factor at hand indicates the possible tax-free rent (TR) earned by the diﬀerent types, say
ξhi ≥ 0 is the rent earned by the h-th subgroup of individuals in the i-th State. Since we are going
to aggregate income information relying on types, we will assign the arithmetic means of incomes or
rents of the involved subgroups to each type. We will subsequently evaluate inequality with the help
of the above Atkinson index formulas, with  ∈ (0, 1) as a suitable aversion parameter. We can ﬁll
the following table to describe factors and types:
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Tax-free Rent Net Income Incoming Transfer
Type 1
∑p1
h=1 ξhi
p1
∑p1
h=1(xhi − ch1xhi)
p1
0
Type 2
∑p1+p2
h=p1+1
ξhi
p2
∑p1+p2
h=p1+1
(xhi − ch1xhi)
p2
0
· · · · · · · · · 0
Type l
∑p1+···+pl
h=p1+···+pl−1+1 ξhi
pl
∑p1+···+pl
h=p1+···+pl−1+1(xhi − ch1xhi)
pl
∑pl
h=1
(
αil(h)die
−δt1)
pl
· · · · · · · · · 0
Type k
∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1 ξhi
pk
∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1(xhi − ch1xhi)
pk
0
The related arithmetic means computed over columns are:
µTR =
1
k
(∑p1
h=1 ξhi
p1
+ · · ·+
∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1 ξhi
pk
)
,
µNI =
1
k
(∑p1
h=1(xhi − ch1xhi)
p1
+ · · ·+
∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1(xhi − ch1xhi)
pk
)
,
µIT =
1
kpl
pl∑
h=1
(
αil(h)die
−δt1) .
In order to employ them in (11), we must keep in mind that the ﬁscal types are k although each
type collects individuals with more income levels, so that the following multi-factor Atkinson index
of inequality is obtained:
IA(YTR, NI, IT ) = 1− 1
3
(
yˆTR
µTR
+
yˆNI
µNI
+
yˆIT
µIT
)
,
where yˆTR, yˆNI and yˆIT respectively correspond to the multi-factor ede determined in (10), i.e.
yˆTR :=
1
k
1
1−
(∑p1h=1 ξhi
p1
)1−
+ · · ·+
(∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1 ξhi
pk
)1− 11− , (20)
yˆNI :=
1
k
1
1−
(∑p1h=1(xhi − ch1xhi)
p1
)1−
+ · · ·+
(∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1(xhi − ch1xhi)
pk
)1− 11− ,
(21)
yˆIT :=
1
k
1
1−
( pl∑
h=1
(
αil(h)die
−δt1))1− 11− . (22)
Consequently we will achieve the multi-factor Atkinson index as follows:
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IA(YTR, NI, IT ) = 1− 1
3

k−

1−
(∑p1h=1 ξhi
p1
)1−
+ · · ·+
(∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1 ξhi
pk
)1− 11−
∑p1
h=1 ξhi
p1
+ · · ·+
∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1 ξhi
pk
+
+
k−

1−
(∑p1h=1(xhi − ch1xhi)
p1
)1−
+ · · ·+
(∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1(xhi − ch1xhi)
pk
)1− 11−
∑p1
h=1(xhi − ch1xhi)
p1
+ · · ·+
∑p1+···+pk
h=p1+···+pk−1+1(xhi − ch1xhi)
pk
+
+
plk
− 1−
[(∑pl
h=1
(
αil(h)die
−δt1))1−] 11−∑pl
h=1 (αil(h)die
−δt1)
 . (23)
In our case, the set of players is P = {TR, NI, IT} and it is easy to sort out the factors' marginal
contributions to inequality, in particular the coordinates of the Banzhaf value are:
βTR(IA) = 1
4
(
1− 7yˆTR
3µTR
+
2yˆNI
3µNI
+
2yˆIT
3µIT
)
, (24)
βNI(IA) = 1
4
(
1− 7yˆNI
3µNI
+
2yˆTR
3µTR
+
2yˆIT
3µIT
)
, (25)
βIT (IA) = 1
4
(
1− 7yˆIT
3µIT
+
2yˆTR
3µTR
+
2yˆNI
3µNI
)
, (26)
It is straightforward to compute the coordinates of the Shapley value of the game as well:
φTR(IA) = 1
6
(
2− 11yˆTR
3µTR
+
5yˆNI
6µNI
+
5yˆIT
6µIT
)
, (27)
φNI(IA) = 1
6
(
1− 11yˆNI
3µNI
+
5yˆTR
6µTR
+
5yˆIT
6µIT
)
, (28)
φIT (IA) = 1
4
(
1− 11yˆIT
3µIT
+
5yˆTR
6µTR
+
5yˆNI
6µNI
)
. (29)
Finally, we are going to evaluate the welfare loss function LA(·) in this case. The values that it takes
are the following:
LA({TR}) = LA({NI})) = LA({IT})) = 0;
LA({TR,NI}) = 1− yˆTR
µTR
− yˆNI
µNI
+
ye,{TR,NI}
µ{TR,NI}
;
LA({TR, IT}) = 1− yˆTR
µTR
− yˆIT
µIT
+
ye,{TR,IT}
µ{TR,IT}
;
LA({NI, IT}) = 1− yˆNI
µNI
− yˆIT
µIT
+
ye,{NI,IT}
µ{NI,IT}
;
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LA({TR,NI, IT}) = 2− yˆTR
µTR
− yˆNI
µNI
− yˆIT
µIT
+
ye,{TR,NI,IT}
µ{TR,NI,IT}
.
Also in this case, the calculation of the Banzhaf value and of the Shapley value of this game can be
easily carried out.
5 Concluding remarks
The success of European policies in achieving its objectives primarily depends on changes determined
on income distributions of people involved. We replicate a typical environment of this policy in
order to observe its own eﬀect on inequality terms. Our exercise tends to construct a preliminary
characterization of a simple outgoing/incoming transfer scheme to see on one side, the simple eﬀect
of a targeted policy on the income proﬁle of a society and then to show on how a multi-factor analysis
on this issue may normatively provide diﬀerent suggestions in terms of welfare loss. To the best of
our knowledge, a theoretical setting about the impact of such transfers on inequality distribution of a
State is still missing in the ongoing literature. Thus we ﬁrst investigate the properties of the Atkinson
index in this framework and employ them to propose a comparison between levels of inequality before
and after the transfers process. Conditioned on the proﬁtability condition, we may infer that the eﬀect
of transfers on inequality may be ambiguous. In case of no-tax area, the reduction in inequality is
easier to be accomplished in the ex-post (after transfer) distribution. We also believe that higher
interpretation of inequality on a targeted policy can be provided by taking into account each income
proﬁle among diﬀerent sources. Indeed a multi-factor methodology is more useful since it allow
to distinguish the marginal contribution of each factor. Our exercise was ﬁrst to decompose the
Atkinson index by income sources à la LY [21] and then to propose it as a characteristic function of
cooperative game (see Chantreuil and Trannoy [7] and Shorrocks [30]). We propose a measure of the
welfare loss characterized by the diﬀerence between the aggregate cost of inequality captured among
income sources and the cost of inequality in the entire income proﬁle. Positivity and monotonicity
are demonstrated. Other properties are still to be completed.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Elena Parilina for valuable comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
19
References
[1] Allanson, P. The redistributive eﬀects of agricultural policy on Scottish farm incomes, Journal of
Agricultural Economics (2006), 57: 117-128.
[2] Allanson, P. On the characterisation and measurement of the redistributive eﬀects of agricultural
policy. Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics (2006), 188, University of Dundee.
[3] Atkinson, A.B. On the measurement of inequality, Journal of Economic Theory (1970), 2: 244-
263.
[4] Banzhaf, J.F. Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, Rutgers Law Review
(1965), 19: 317-343.
[5] Barr, G., Passarelli, F. Who has the power in the EU?, Mathematical Social Sciences (2009), 57:
339-366.
[6] Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D. and Auersperg, M. A new procedure for the measurement of in-
equality within and among population subgroups, (1981), Canadian Journal of Economics, 14:
665-685.
[7] Chantreuil, F., Trannoy A. Inequality decomposition values: the trade-oﬀ between marginality
and eﬃciency. Journal of Economic Inequality (2013), 11 (1): 8398.
[8] Charpentier, A., Mussard, S. Income inequality games, Journal of Economic Inequality (2011),
9: 529-554.
[9] Combes, P.-Ph., Overman, H. The Spatial Distribution of Economic Activities in the European
Union, Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics (2004), 4: 28452909
[10] The Common Agricultural Policy, A partnership between Europe and Farmers, Publications Of-
ﬁce of the European Union, 2012. http : //ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap−overview/2012en.pdf
[11] Drechsel, J. Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains, Lecture Notes in Economics and
Mathematical Systems, 644, Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2010).
[12] Ebert U. Measurement of inequality: an attempt at uniﬁcation and generalization. Social Choice
and Welfare (1988), 5: 147-169
[13] European Union. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty
establishing the European Community, (2002),Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities,
C325: 33-184.
[14] Faigle, U., Kern, W., Kuipers, J.: On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game,
Int. J. of Game Theory (2001), 30: 79-98.
[15] Fei J., Ranis G. and Kuo W.Y. Growth and the Family distribution of Income by factor compo-
nents. Quarterly Journal of Economics (1980), 92 (1): 451-473
[16] Gorton, M., Hubbard, C., Hubbard, L. The Folly of European Union Policy Transfer: Why the
Common Agricultural policy (CAP) Does Not Fit Central and Eastern Europe, Regional Studies
(2009), 43: 1305-1317.
[17] Keeney, M. The distributional impact of direct payments on Irish farm incomes. Journal of
Agricultural Economics, (2000), 51, 2: 252-265.
[18] Hansen, H., Teuber, R. Assessing the impacts of EU's common agricultural policy on regional
convergence: sub-national evidence from Germany, Applied Economics (2011), 43: 3755-3765.
20
[19] Koczy, L.A. Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Coun-
cil of Ministers, Mathematical Social Sciences (2012), 63: 152-158.
[20] Le Breton, M., Montero, M., Zaporohets, V. Voting power in the EU council of ministers and
fair decision making in distribtive politics, Mathematical Social Sciences (2012), 63: 159-173.
[21] Lerman, R. and Yitzhaki, S. Income inequality by income sources: a new approach and application
to the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics (1985), LXVII , 1: 151-156
[22] Matthews, A., The European Union's Common Agricultural Policy and the Developing Countries:
the Struggle for Coherence, Journal of European Integration (2008), 30: 381-399.
[23] Owen, G. Game Theory, III edition, New York: Academic Press (1995).
[24] Pignataro, G. Measuring equality of opportunity by Shapley value, Economics Bulletin (2010),
30(1): 786-798.
[25] Schmeidler, D.: The nucleolus of a characteristic function game, SIAM Journal of Applied Math-
ematics (1969), 17(6): 1163-1170.
[26] Schmid, E., Sinabell F., Hofreither M.F. Direct payments of the CAP distribution across farm
holdings in the EU and eﬀects on farm household incomes in Austria, (2006) Discussion paper
19.
[27] Shapley, L.S.: A Value for n-person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games, volume
II (H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker eds.), Annals of Mathematical Studies, Princeton University
Press (1953), 28: 307-317.
[28] Shorrocks, A.F. Inequality decomposition by factor components, Econometrica (1984), 50: 193-
211.
[29] Shorrocks, A.F. Inequality decomposition by population subgroups, Econometrica (1984), 52:
1369-1385.
[30] Shorrocks A.F. Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: a uniﬁed framework based
on the Shapley value, Journal of Economic Inequality (2013), 11 (1): 99126.
[31] The European Union Budget at a Glance, Publications Oﬃce of the European Union, 2010.
http : //ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/glance/budgetglanceen.pdf
21
 
